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Public service broadcasting and the
challenge of new technology: A case
study of Japan’s NHK
Roya Akhavan-Majid

Abstract
The decade of 1980’s was characterized by multiplying challenges to public service broadcasting
in many countries. The threat to the financial viability of public broadcasting, which had
originated with the stagnation of receiver fee revenue in the face of rapidly escalating production
costs, was compounded by the economic-ideological challenges posed by the advent of new media
technologies. By the end of the 1980s, public broadcasting systems everywhere appeared to be
either crumbling or managing a slow decline.
As a system operating in a uniquely different, and little-studied, policy environment, Japan’s
public service broadcasting system, NHK, presents a sharp contrast to this grim picture of
decline. In contrast to many of its Western counterparts, such as the BBC, for example, NHK has
succeeded in adapting new technologies to its own advantage and has grown tremendously in
power and prominence as a broadcasting institution since the early 1980s.
Based on extensive personal interviews conducted with Japanese media scholars, commercial
broadcasters, and NHK representatives in the course of a four-month field study in Japan
(January 1991-April 1991), as well as library research, this study analyzes the reasons behind
this contrast in terms of 1) the elements in the Japanese policy environment which have given
NHK an advantage over its counterparts and 2) the management strategies pursued by NHK itself
in response to new technologies.

The decade of 1980’s was characterized by multiplying challenges to public service
broadcasting in many countries. The threat to the financial viability of public broadcasting, which
had originated with the stagnation of receiver fee revenue in the face of rapidly escalating
production costs, was compounded by the economic-ideological challenges posed by the advent
of new media technologies.
The economic challenge posed by new technology took different forms in different
countries. In those countries where the public broadcasting system was a monopoly, the potential
for commercial exploitation of new broadcasting technologies created pressures for liberalization
and privatization; pressures which encompassed not only public broadcasting but also
telecommunications monopolies. These economically-motivated pressures toward privatization
were further reinforced by politically conservative arguments in favor of market competition and
by an ideological assault on the very concept of ‘public service’ broadcasting and its relevance in
the new information age. In those countries, on the other hand, where a commercial system
already existed, the primary economic challenge to public broadcasting was posed by the
competition from new forms of program delivery such as cable and satellite. Yet, the pre-

existence of a commercial system in a country did not mean that its public broadcasting system
would be immune to ideological challenge in favor of complete privatization, as demonstrated in
the case of the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), for example. By the end of the 1980’s
the edifice [of public broadcasting] was widely seen to be crumbling. Public
broadcasting institutions and the notions of cultural and political discourse that
undergird them seemed to be under attack everywhere1
As a system operating in a uniquely different, and little-studied, policy environment, Japan’s
public service broadcasting system, Nippon Hoso Kyokai (NHK) presents a sharp contrast to this
grim picture of decline. Indeed, in contrast to many of its European counterparts, such as the
BBC, for example, NHK has succeeded in adapting new technologies to its own advantage and
has grown tremendously in power and prominence as a broadcasting institution since the early
1980s. As a first-comer in Japanese broadcasting with a continuing edge over the commercial
broadcasters in Japan, NHK has rapidly outpaced its commercial competitors and is now poised to
become a major international force in broadcast technology and program production.
Against this backdrop, the purpose of this paper is to analyze the reasons behind this
contrast in terms of 1) the elements in the Japanese policy environment which have given NHK
an advantage over its counterparts and 2) the management strategies pursued by NHK itself in
response to new technologies.
Historical roots and present structure: An overview
NHK was formed in 1926, when the Japanese government urged the three receiver-fee
supported stations originally established in 1924 by the Japanese newspaper publishers and
electronic manufacturers, to merge into one nationwide network. Motivated by a desire to tighten
government control over the system, this merger marked the beginning of growing government
interference in the affairs of NHK, a control which reached its peak during World War 11.2 After
the war, NHK was reorganized by the General Headquarters for the Allied Powers (GHQ) based
on a new Broadcast Law (1950) designed to insulate NHK from government control. The law
provided for a 12-member board of directors, to be appointed by the prime minister. It also
sanctioned the continuation of the same receiver fee-based system of financing, within which
NHK itself had been responsible for collecting the receiver fees. In addition, the General
Headquarters (GHQ) established a Radio Regulatory Commission, (RCC) patterned after the
Federal Communications Commission (FCC), to oversee and regulate broadcasting in Japan.
Soon after the departure of the GHQ in 1952, however, the RRC was absorbed into the Ministry
for Posts and Telecommunications (MPT).3 Since then, MPT has remained the primary authority
responsible for regulating broadcasting and telecommunications in Japan. A fully commercial
system of broadcasting was established shortly afterwards in 1951, with the licenses going to a
handful of consortia dominated largely by newspaper publishing interests. Thus, the commercial
broadcasting industry in Japan was founded, from the outset, as an extension of the interests of
the country’s newspaper industry. Both industries are currently dominated by five major media
conglomerates, NTV-Yomiuri Shimbun, TV Asahi-Asahi Shimbun, TBS-Mainichi Shimbun, TV
Tokyo-Nikkei Shimbun, and Fuji TV-Sankei Shimbun.4
Although the competition between NHK and the commercial broadcasters has been fierce,
NHK has been able to maintain its position as the country’s leading broadcaster. As the ‘senior’

broadcaster (an important concept in Japan), NHK has been able to attract the country’s best
engineering, production, and programming talent and managed to remain highly popular with
audiences, commanding over half of the Japanese viewership.
As the country’s public service broadcaster, NHK displays a vastly different approach to
programming than the commercial broadcasters. As Donald Browne has pointed out
NHK generally has taken upon itself the obligation to preserve traditional
elements of Japanese culture and to promote living culture. If NHK broadcasts a
fifteenth-century tale, it will make the production as authentic as possible in
setting, costuming, and staging... Commercial broadcasters are far more apt to
treat traditional or contemporary drama as pegs on which to hang action, feeling
that this is the key to attract larger audiences... Commercial stations are more
likely to imitate already successful entertainment shows and to emphasize the
colourful, loud, and comedic aspects of shows than is NHK.5
Among some of NHK’s most popular cultural programs have been such multiple-episode
documentaries as the ‘Silk Road’ (1980) and the Yellow River’ (1987), both of which managed to
garner some of the highest ratings ever achieved by any station during prime-time. Another
example of high quality and popular cultural programming by NHK is its ‘Taiga Drama,’ a drama
series which recreates figures and events from Japanese history.
NHK’s success in producing quality programs is also reflected in the number of
international awards it has received. In 1989, 38 NHK programs were nominated for international
competitions, 14 of which received major awards.
Although the commercial stations have made major strides in raising the quality of their
news and public affairs programming during the last decade, NHK continues to remain in the lead
in this area, providing a greater amount, as well as a higher quality, of informational
programming.
NHK’s programming activities also benefit from one of the largest broadcasting budgets
in the world. In 1990, NHK operated on a budget of approximately 400 billion yen (3 billion
dollars), 97% of which was obtained from receiver fees.
NHK’s financial viability was threatened in the early 1980’s, when the company began to
experience shortfalls in its budget due to the saturation of television sets and stagnating receiver
fees. In view of the political difficulty of raising receiver fees, the Ministry for Posts and
Telecommunications responded by authorizing NHK in 1982 to engage in a limited range of
commercial activities through subsidiary companies to supplement its receiver fee income. The
first commercially-oriented subsidiary, NHK Enterprises, was established shortly afterwards, with
the mandate to coproduce and sell NHK programs for domestic as well as international
consumption. NHK’s involvement with subsidiary companies accelerated6 after a 1988
amendment to the Broadcast Law authorizing NHK to invest its receiver fees (and not just outside
income) in its affiliated companies, so long as the activities of such companies were ‘in harmony
with NHK’s character as public service broadcaster.’ NHK’s activities through its subsidiaries
have not only given a visible boost to its financial condition, but they have also vastly expanded
the scope of NHK’s domestic and international activities.
In addition to its involvement in such varied areas as commercial teletext broadcasting and
international program co-production, NHK currently operates two medium-wave AM radio
networks, one VHF-FM network, an external broadcasting service, two television networks

(General TV and Educational TV), and two of the three channels on Japan’s second generation
operational direct broadcast satellite (BS3). (The third channel is run as subscription television by
a commercial consortium, JSB). The satellite service, offering multi-language news and sports on
one channel, and movies and cultural programming as well as experimental HDTV and multiplex
sound programming on the other, has had great success with Japanese viewers. As of September
1991, 4.5 million households were able to receive NHK’s DBS (Direct Broadcast Satellite)
signals, via cable as well as through dish antennas.7 Because of NHK’s ability to collect DBS fees
from every household with the technical capability to receive its signals, the rise in DBS-equipped
households has given a major boost to NHK’s budget, averting the original threat posed by
stagnating receiver fees.
NHK expanded the reach of its programs even further in April 1991 when it began
beaming its signals to Japanese households in the U.S. and in Europe via INTELSAT.
Currently, NHK awaits permission from the Ministry for Post and Telecommunications to
begin operation of a television facsimile system, using a communication satellite.
NHK’s advantages over other public broadcasting systems
NHK’s ability to take advantage of the very same trends which have posed serious threats
to the survival of public broadcasting institutions elsewhere in the world has been due to a variety
of factors. Some of these are inherent to the cultural and political environment of Japan and the
historical roots of NHK itself, while others are related to management choices and policy
decisions. Each of these factors will be discussed in turn.
Elements of fate: Cultural, organizational, and political advantages
Among the elements of fate giving NHK a built-in advantage over its Western
counterparts has been the highly homogeneous nature of the Japanese audience. In contrast to
most other public broadcasting systems, whose efforts to attend to the needs and tastes of their
diverse viewership tends to preclude their ability to attract high ‘ratings’, NHK has had to appeal
to a largely culturally homogeneous audience. It has therefore been easier for NHK to remain
popular with, and relevant to, a large percentage of the Japanese viewing public, without
sacrificing quality and cultural value.
NHK’s greatest advantage over other public broadcasting systems in the new information
age, however, lies in its organizational set-up. In contrast to its counterparts in other countries,
which have had little or no involvement in technological research and development, since early in
its development, NHK has functioned as a forerunner and standard-bearer in all areas of broadcast
technology.8 Since its establishment in 1928, NHK’s Technical Research Institute has been the
site of a variety of innovations, including the latest advances in HDTV technology and multiplex
sound broadcasting. NHK’s ‘Hi-Vision’ standard, which makes use of a DBS band compression
system called MUSE (also developed by NHK) has already been adopted as the Japanese HDTV
standard. Since 1989, NHK has been broadcasting in HDTV on an experimental basis and has
cooperated with Japanese manufacturers in developing HDTV television sets.
NHK’s leading role in technological Research and Development thus contrasts sharply
with other public broadcasting systems which are often seen as slow-moving and unresponsive to
new technology.

A further advantaged of NHK over its counterparts is that it has never faced either a
conservative ideological challenge, or pressures from commercial interests seeking entry into the
broadcasting market. The lack of the ideological pressure may be explained, in part, by the
distinctly pragmatic nature of Japanese culture and politics. To the extent that economic and
ideological challenges to public institutions tend to be interrelated, the lack of ideological
pressure may also be explained, in part, by the absence of commercial pressure.
In contrast to the United Kingdom, where ITV was established as a commercial system
subject to strict public controls on commercial time and other related activities, the commercial
system in Japan has developed as a fully commercialized system and, along with the closely
related newspaper industry, has absorbed much of the advertising money available in Japan. Thus,
unlike the BBC, NHK has never been under pressure to open its doors to commercial advertising.
Indeed, any suggestions of commercialization as an alternative means of financing for NHK have
been fiercely opposed by the Japanese commercial broadcasters, for whom the starkest doomsday
scenario consists of a day in which a ratings powerhouse like NHK, commanding two full HDTV
channels, would be converted into a competing commercial enterprise.
The case was different with Japan’s telecommunications monopoly, Nippon Telegraph
and Telephone (NTT), and the country’s telecommunications market, which was privatized in
1984 largely as a result of pressure from big business interests seeking to enter the lucrative
telecommunications market. Even then, ideological discourse played a minor role in the debates
which led to the privatization of NTT. Although such phrases as ‘efficiency’ and ‘serving the
consumer through competition’ were conspicuous in the final policy statements, it was the need
for accommodating the demands of the U.S., on the one hand, and the pressures being exerted by
the Japanese big business interests, on the other, which ultimately led to NTT’s privatization.9
Given NHK’s popularity, sound financial base, and leading role in new technology, as
well as the absence of economic and ideological pressures pushing for its commercialization, it is
clear that NHK shares very few of the challenges faced by its counterparts in other advanced
industrialized countries. At the same time however, NHK’s encounter with the new information
technologies and its efforts to respond to their potential threats and opportunities has not, by any
means, been free of challenge. Operating in a dual broadcasting environment, and under the
supervision of a government ministry (MPT) whose interests lie in ensuring that neither of the
two broadcasting systems become too powerful to challenge its regulatory authority and subtle
control, NHK has faced unique challenges of its own. Unlike its counterparts, NHK has had to
operate within the limits placed on its ambitions by the country’s powerful commercial media
conglomerates, whose interests have come into increasing conflict with those of NHK in the
course of the last decade.
As a major elite power group, the commercial media conglomerates constitute a strong
influence on the government’s media policy. Indeed, if one were to identify the top four elite
power groups in Japan, these would be the ruling Liberal Democratic Party, the country’s top
government ministries (including the MPT), big business, and the mass media conglomerates. The
media conglomerates derive their power from a variety of factors, including 1) domination of
newspaper and broadcast ownership patterns, which gives them considerable control over the
flow of information in Japan, and 2) integration with the other three elite power groups, through
social clubs, economic interlocking, and flow of personnel, which creates a high level of
commonality of interest between the commercial media conglomerates and the other powerful
elites.10

It is in the context of the dynamics created by these clashing interests, therefore, that
NHK’s management strategy and responses to technological advancements in the new
information age need to be evaluated.
Elements of freewill: NHK’s management strategy in the new information age.
NHK’s first encounter with new technology came in the mid 1950s, when cable
technology first emerged as a means of enhancing signal reception in remote and mountainous
areas. Based on its mandate to pursue nation-wide coverage of its signals, as well as its interest in
expanding its receiver fee base, NHK cooperated with cable operators seeking to establish
retransmission units.
A ferment began in this harmonious relationship, however, when a company named NCV
sought in 1968 to establish Japan’s first program origination urban CATV system. Fearing the
threat of competition from cable, in a rare coalition with the commercial broadcasters, NHK asked
the Ministry for Posts and Telecommunications to stop the venture. Seeking to respond to the
strong protest on the part of the mass media elite, yet lacking any legal grounds to block the
venture, MPT asked NCV to allow the existing broadcasters to join it as partners in the proposed
cable TV company, leading to a forced coalition among adversarial interests which brought an
effective halt to the venture.11
The resistance by the vested broadcasting interests to CATV development in Japan
compounded such other pre-existing problems as market uncertainty and shortage of software for
cable programming, effectively halting cable’s further advances in Japan until the late 1980s.
Reflecting this late start, current cable penetration in Japan stands at a mere 20%.12
NHK’s posture with regards to program origination cable, however, took a sharp turn in
the late 1980s, largely as a result of NHK’s involvement in and success with direct satellite
broadcasting.
As already mentioned, in order to be entitled to collect receiver fees from each household,
NHK needs to establish the household’s technical capability to receive NHK signals. In the case
of DBS, NHK would need to establish that the household is able to receive the signals either via
cable or through dish antennas. Although a large number of dish antennas have been sold in
Japan, cable remains, by far, the primary means of DBS signal reception. It is this simple fact
which has tied NHK’s fortunes to those of the CATV operators in Japan. Building further on this
commonality of interest, NHK recently began an effort to convince Japanese cable operators to
collect its DBS fees at the same time that they collect their own cable subscription fees, offering
them a commission for their service. Should NHK succeed in concluding such arrangements with
all cable operators, it will soon be able to collect fees from almost all of the 4.5 million
households currently able to receive its signals. Thus, in contrast to a decade earlier, cable no
longer poses a threat to NHK. Rather, every new cable subscription promises to automatically
bring with it a DBS ‘subscription’ for NHK.
NHK’s ability to harmonize its interests with those of the cable operators and its growing
success with direct satellite broadcasting has deepened its conflict of interest with the commercial
broadcasters, exacerbating the tensions which have been brewing between the two power groups
since the early days of NHK involvement with DBS technology.13
Japan’s first experimental DBS project was initiated by the joint efforts of MPT and NHK
in 1972. Launched in 1978, the experimental satellite (BSE) functioned until 1980 when a
transponder failure brought a halt to the project. NHK, which bore 60% of the project’s costs,
used BSE to carry out various experiments including HDTV and multiplex sound broadcasting.

Japan’s first operational satellite, BS2, was launched in 1984. As in the case of the experimental
satellite, BS2 was used exclusively by NHK in fulfilling its mandate of providing nationwide
coverage of its programs and carrying out innovative technological experiments.
NHK’s close involvement in the development and exclusive use of Japan’s first two direct
broadcast satellites proved from the beginning to be a source of great anxiety for the country’s
commercial broadcasters, an anxiety which did not seem to be relieved by NHK’s repeated
assurances that it intended to use the satellites only for nation-wide coverage and experimental
purposes.
The commercial broadcasters’ general peril at the country’s involvement in DBS
technology, however, began to reach new heights in 1980, when MPT announced its intention to
launch a new four-channel satellite, allocating one of the channels for commercial broadcasting
purposes. MPT’s plans met with the strong opposition of the commercial broadcasters who, aside
from their weariness about NHK’s domination of the DBS, viewed DBS technology as a major
threat to the reason for existence of the local stations. In addition, they feared the potential for
advertising competition implied by the development of such alternative commercial channels.
However, faced with MPT’s determination to launch the satellite, the National Association of
Commercial Broadcasters (NACB) announced, after lengthy deliberations, that it was ready to
participate in the project, assuming that there would be no advertising, and that the commercial
broadcasters would hold the majority of the shares of the proposed commercial channel.14
In the course of the ensuing policy negotiations - which, typical of Japanese media policy
making, structures and process took place in the context of semi-formal MPT ‘advisory
committees’ representing all powerful parties potentially affected by policy - it became apparent
that there was a much larger number of businesses interested in investing in the new company
than originally anticipated. By the time the process of negotiations ended, the commercial
broadcasters were left with a mere 19% of the shares as opposed to the majority share they had
expected. Although the combined share of the five media conglomerates (including the 16%
obtained by the newspaper companies) stood at 35%, giving the conglomerates the controlling
interest, the lion’s share of over 60% was allocated to a variety of big businesses, including
Japan’s major banks and trading houses.
A further blow to the interests of the commercial broadcasters came in 1985, when NHK
began considering plans to use one of the two DBS channels allocated to it to start a new NHK
channel devoted to special DBS programming. Taking advantage of its position as a public
broadcaster supported by receiver fees, NHK later announced that it intended to ultimately
finance the new DBS channel by charging an additional fee from all Japanese households
equipped with DBS reception capability. The sudden change in NHK’s DBS plans created a
formidable threat of competition for commercial broadcasters, a competition which would be
especially difficult to beat because of NHK’s ability as a public broadcaster automatically to
count the DBS-equipped households as ‘subscribers’ to its DBS service, leaving the commercial
broadcasters with the task of soliciting additional subscriptions from the same pool of households.
NHK’s rapid gains in DBS subscription in the face of the much slower growth in the
subscriptions to the new commercial DBS channel (which began operation in April 1991),
appears to have realized the Commercial broadcasters’ worst fears. And NHK’s inroads into
experimental HDTV broadcasting on two full-fledged DBS channels, while the commercial
broadcasters continue to own only 19% of one channel, has further placed the commercial
broadcasters at a disadvantage.

The accumulating disadvantages of commercial broadcasters vis-à-vis NHK has turned the
current preparations for the launching of Japan’s third generation satellite (BS4) in 1997 into a
bitter fight. Currently, MPT plans to equip BS4 with the capability to carry 8 channels, the
maximum number allocated to Japan based on International Telecommunications Union
agreements. Still discontent with their minimal share of BS3, each of the five major media
conglomerates have claimed the right to be allocated a minimum of one DBS channel.15 NHK, on
the other hand, has been pushing for at least one, and if possible, two additional channels on the
DBS, bringing its share from two to up to four channels.16 NHK plans to use two of the channels
for round-the-clock special HDTV programming and the other two for broadcasting its current
programs to households without HDTV reception capability. In return for the additional DBS
channels, NHK has offered to give up one of its terrestrial channels.17 This offer on the part of
NHK is in line with its strategy of moving toward complete reliance on satellite technology by the
end of the century. NHK’s determination to focus on space technology as a primary means of
delivering its programs is also reflected in its willingness to invest its own funds on procuring and
launching foreign-made back-up satellites to insure the smooth operation of its DBS channels
which, in the course of the last decade, have seen several transponder failures. Aside from NHK
and the commercial broadcasters, two other parties are currently competing for the limited
number of DBS channels. These are Japan’s major trading houses and banks, already partners in
almost all areas broadcasting in Japan, and the Education Ministry’s University of the Air.
Given a 1990 trade agreement between Japan and the U.S., obligating Japan to buy all
future satellites from U.S. manufacturers, the difficulty in deciding who will use BS4 has also
halted the process of the satellite’s procurement. Until it is decided who will use the satellite, and
hence who will pay for it, MPT will not be able to move forward with the country’s plans for
BS4.18
While the deadlock over BS4 has frustrated NHK’s plans to move ahead with its future
DBS plans, it has not placed a limit on NHK’s space-age ambitions. Determined not to allow any
delay in its plans, NHK recently turned its attention to Communication Satellite (CS) technology.
Given NHK’s move toward cooperation with cable, DBS is no longer the only means for NHK of
expanding its receiver fee base. NHK’s prospects for a successful adoption of CS and CATV
technology as a primary means of program delivery has been enhanced by the Ministry for Posts
and Telecommunication’s favorable posture toward increased use of communication satellites in
Japan. Calling Japan’s emerging network of CS and cable (which currently consists of two
American-made communication satellites) the ‘Space Cable Network,’ MPT is currently offering
low interest loans and other incentives to prospective investors.19
Given the growing need in Japan for attractive programming to fill the increasing numbers
of cable and DBS channels, NHK has already taken bold steps toward becoming a dominant force
in the area of program production. This new direction in NHK activities is exemplified not only in
the program production activities of NHK Enterprises, but in a far more large scale venture
(MICO) entered into in 1991 by NHK and over 40 of Japan’s ‘fortune 100’ companies, including
such major businesses as Itoh-Chuo, Mitsubishi, Mitsui, Marubeni, Daiichi Kangyo Bank, and
Sumitomo Bank, to buy and sell programs and to produce programs for international, as well as
domestic consumption.20 Fearing an uproar from commercial broadcasters, NHK limited its initial
financial investment in MICO to only 5%. Its major investment came in the form of personnel,
with 13 top NHK executives moving to head various departments in the new venture. NHK does
intend, however, to gradually increase its financial investment in the venture.21 NHK’s investment
in MICO adds yet another dimension to the growing scope of its commercial activities which

began in the early 1980s when NHK’s first commercial subsidiary, NHK enterprises, was
established as a means of supplementing NHK’s receiver fee income.
NHK’s clear advantages over commercial broadcasters in utilizing new forms of program
delivery such as DBS, HDTV, and CS+CATV, and its bold inroads into program production,
combined with the bitter debates over BS4, made 1991 a critical year for commercial
broadcasters. In the explosive atmosphere of the spring of 1991, the commercial broadcasters and
their parent corporations, the country’s newspaper publishers, were finally given an opportunity
to strike back.
On April 24th, an NHK back-up satellite, purchased from an American manufacturer
(G.E.) and launched from the Cape Canaveral Air Force Base, failed to launch into orbit. When
reporting on the matter to the Telecommunications Committee of the Japanese parliament, NHK
president, Keiji Shima, was asked, as a matter of course, where he had been at the time of the
launch. In response, Mr. Shima indicated that he had been at the General Electric Co.
headquarters in New Jersey. He later changed his initial response, however, by saying that he had
actually been at Hotel New Otani in Los Angeles, directing the operation via telephone.22 The
contradictory statements by Keiji Shima, the man responsible for NHK’s aggressive strategy for
much of the 1980s and early 1990s, gave the Japanese commercial media the story they had been
waiting for. United in their interests against NHK, the Japanese media succeeded in orchestrating
the incident into scandalous proportions, leading Shima to resign his post as NHK president.23
The new president, Mikio Kawaguchi, who, according to the Japan Newspaper Editors
and Publishers News Bulletin was selected for his ‘good sense of judgement and balance,’ is
likely to follow many of Shima’s policies. He may be expected, however, to move with greater
caution than his predecessor vis-à-vis the interests of the country’s powerful media
conglomerates. He identified the major issue facing NHK very clearly in his inaugural address
when he said: ‘...Harmony and progress is important. We must maintain a friendly and
harmonious relationship with commercial broadcasting networks and other related circles, while
striving to achieve steady growth of our public broadcasting activities.’24
Conclusions and suggestions for future research
As this study has sought to illustrate, Japan’s public service broadcaster, NHK, has faced
few of the challenges posed to its Western counterparts by the advent of new technology. Thanks
to a creative and forward-looking management strategy and a uniquely different policy
environment, NHK appears to have in fact been able to take full advantage of the opportunities
provided by new technology.
The major challenge posed to the interests of NHK continues to remain the collective
clout of the country’s five major commercial media conglomerates, whose demands on
government media policy is likely to continue to define the boundaries for NHK’s ambitions.
Although there is little doubt that NHK has grown in power and prestige in the new
information age, this discussion would not be complete without addressing a further question; that
of the impact of NHK’s success in adapting to new technology on the integrity of its character as
a public service broadcaster. Has NHK’s increasing ties with Japanese big business and its
increasing involvement in commercial activities through subsidiary companies, in other words,
been detrimental to its character as a public service broadcaster?
Obviously, the answer to this question depends, in part, on the definition of ‘public service
broadcasting’ itself. It may be argued that despite the many dimensions that such a definition may

include, ultimately public service broadcasting is defined on the basis of two components, 1)
program quality and 2) mode of financing. Of these two elements, program quality may be said to
have the greater weight, since the non-commercial mode of financing has been designed primarily
as a means of protecting the programming component from the dictates of mass taste and profit.
If we look only at the mode of financing at NHK, we will find that, although the bulk of
NHK funds continue to come from receiver fees, a commercial component has indeed come to
supplement its income. The major question which remains to be answered then is whether this
commercial link has discernibly altered the quality and orientation of programming at NHK.
Future research on NHK needs to focus on a systematic study of the impact of NHK’s growing
scope of commercial and international activities on the quality of its programs and, thus, on its
overall character as a public service broadcasting system.
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